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The  European  System  of  Central  Banks  (ESCB)  sets  up 
temporary networks bringing together researchers from 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central 
banks (NCBs) to gain a better understanding of economic 
mechanisms. The Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), active 
from February 2006 to the end of 2009, was asked to 
identify the causes and characteristics of wage dynamics 
relevant to monetary policy and to clarify the link between 
wages, labour costs and prices at both micro- and macro-
economic level. More specifically, the network aimed to 
answer the following questions : how are wages, labour 
costs  and  their  components  adjusted  throughout  the 
business cycle and in response to shocks ? Are there any 
sectoral  or  regional  differences ?  How  often  are  wages 
adjusted ? Is wage rigidity nominal or real, symmetrical 
or asymmetrical ? What are the causes of wage or labour 
cost  rigidity ?  How  do  adjustments  to  workers’  wages 
affect marginal costs and business decisions on output 
and prices ? How is wage and labour cost rigidity reflected 
in price rigidity and inflation persistence ? What are the 
factors – such as wage-setting institutions, competition 
on product markets, and globalisation – which determine 
the scale and speed of the transmission of labour costs to 
output and prices ?
To  answer  these  questions,  the  WDN  researchers  were 
divided into four groups. The micro group conducted an 
econometric analysis of wage rigidity and the behaviour 
of firms on the basis of micro-economic data. The macro 
group  introduced  the  concept  of  wage  rigidity  into   
macro-econometric  models  with  frictional  unemploy-
ment. The survey group polled more than 15,000 firms 
in  sixteen  European  countries.  Finally,  the  meta  group 
coordinated the whole project and aimed to present gen-
eral conclusions and economic policy recommendations. 
Altogether, more than 70 researchers, employees of the 
25 European NCBs or the ECB and external consultants, 
took part in the WDN.
The  researchers  tapped  many  sources  of  information, 
some  of  which  had  never  been  analysed  before.  The 
usual  macro-economic  time  series  were  used  for  the 
analyses and the application of macro-economic models. 
The  researchers  gathered  institutional  data  specific  to 
the various countries from the labour market specialists 
of the NCBs. In addition, they relied heavily on micro-
economic or individual data obtained from employers or 
workers. Those data include the annual accounts of firms 
and their social balance sheets, if available, plus social 
security administrative data relating to each worker, and 
existing surveys such as the Structure of Earnings Survey 
(SES),  which  looks  at  the  structure  and  breakdown  of 
wages. These micro-economic data are only available for 
a small number of countries, and do not always permit 
a perfect international comparison. To supplement the 
available statistics, the WDN decided to conduct an ad 
hoc wage setting survey covering over 15,000 firms in 
the  period  2007-2008.  The  largely  harmonised  results 
were published in time for sixteen European countries, 
including eleven euro area members. The questionnaire 
for Germany was not sufficiently similar to the common 
model to be used for comparative studies. In order to 56
assess  the  labour  market’s  response  to  the  economic 
and financial crisis, a new questionnaire was sent to the 
same sample of firms in ten countries during the summer 
of  2009,  but  not  all  replied.  The  composition  of  the 
sample used for the international analysis is presented 
in Annex 1.
This article aims to give an overview of the main results 
of  the  WDN’s  work  and  the  principal  implications  for 
monetary policy. It starts by examining the wage-setting 
institutions  in  Europe,  and  the  structure  of  wages  in 
a  number  of  countries  for  which  data  are  available, 
before  analysing  the  network’s  main  micro-economic 
findings :  those  relate  to  the  frequency  and  timing  of 
wage adjustments, the link between wages and prices, 
indexation mechanisms, wages of both new and experi-
enced employees, and downward wage rigidity. It then 
examines the implications of these findings at macro-
economic  level  and  in  terms  of  monetary  policy.  The 
last section focuses on the response of firms to shocks 
in general and to the crisis in particular. A conclusion 
follows.
1.  Wage-setting institutions and 
the structure of wages
1.1  Wage-setting institutions
The countries which joined the economic and monetary 
union no longer have an independent monetary policy 
or a national exchange rate instrument, and their fiscal 
policy is subject to the stability pact rules. Consequently, 
many  of  the  macro-economic  adjustments  have  to  be 
made via the labour market. Institutions play a key role 
in the way in which wages and employment respond to 
economic developments. They are therefore a vital feature 
of the network’s conclusions. As an example, a number 
of the studies examined below highlight the importance 
of  indexation  mechanisms  and  collective  agreements, 
whether concluded within the firm or at a higher level 
(sectoral, regional or national). The heterogeneous nature 
of the institutions is therefore a challenge for the common 
monetary policy, and that challenge will increase when 
new countries with a different institutional set-up join the 
monetary union.
























Regulated bargaining with role 
for government and indexation  
Deregulated bargaining
AT, EL, FR, NL, PT : high coverage rate, dominant sectoral level 
and minimum wage
DE, IT : no minimum wage
IE : limited bargaining at national level
DK, SE : very high coverage rate with greater role for 
government and indexation
BE, CY, LU : widespread indexation
ES, SI, FI : more limited indexation via collective agreements
CZ, UK : decentralised, little if any coordination 
(as in the US and JP)
EE, HU, LT, PL : transition, government 
still plays a role
Source  : Du Caju et al. (2008).57
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The  WDN  sent  out  a  questionnaire  on  the  institutions 
to the national experts of all the participating European 
countries plus the United States and Japan. It aimed to 
gather information on the general institutional character-
istics of wage setting in the countries concerned.
This information shows that Europe comprises a mosaic 
of wage-setting institutions (Du Caju et al., 2008). It is 
nevertheless possible to group together the countries with 
a comparable combination of institutions. The first group, 
which comprises the euro area countries which took part 
in the survey, has a system of regulated wage bargaining. 
In other words, the negotiations are subject to rules laid 
down by the government, by legislation, or by binding 
agreements.  There  are  nonetheless  some  differences 
between  the  countries  in  this  group.  A  central  group 
consisting  of  Austria,  France,  Greece,  the  Netherlands 
and Portugal, applies extension mechanisms – collective 
agreements  are  extended  to  workers  and /or  firms  not 
involved in the negotiations – and therefore has high cov-
erage rates for the collective agreements, a wage-setting 
system  dominated  by  the  sectoral  level  and  minimum 
wages. Several countries differ somewhat from this cen-
tral group. Thus, in Germany and Italy, there is no national 
minimum wage. Ireland has little bargaining at national 
level. Denmark and Sweden have higher rates of union 
membership and coverage. In a sub-group of countries, 
the government plays a bigger role as a third party or 
intermediary facilitating the negotiations, and indexation 
is also more important. Yet there are some divergences 
within this sub-group. Belgium, Cyprus and Luxembourg 
apply a system of direct indexation, regulated at national 
level,  while  in  Spain,  Slovenia  and  Finland  the  more 
limited indexation forms the subject of collective agree-
ments. A second group of countries features bargaining 
with few regulations. The core group here comprises the 
Czech Republic and the United Kingdom, where bargain-
ing is decentralised and uncoordinated.  (1) Since their tran-
sition to a market economy, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania 
and Poland have introduced radical reforms, although the 
government still plays a role.
In  most  countries,  the  institutions  have  remained  fairly 
stable  over  the  past  two  decades,  though  collective 
agreements at firm level have gained in importance. They 
make it easier to align wages with the micro-economic 
situation.
1.2  Wage structure
The  Bank’s  WDN  team  used  the  Structure  of  Earnings 
Survey conducted by the Directorate General of Statistics 
and Economic Information (DGSEI) for the purpose of ana-
lysing wage differentials between sectors (Du Caju, Rycx 
and Tojerow, 2011). That survey is based on data relating 
to around 100,000 workers in Belgium. It revealed that 
wages vary according to the characteristics of the workers, 
their job and their employer, namely age, sex, education, 
occupation, seniority, type of contract, working time and 
size of firm. Thus, all other things being equal, the highest 
wages are paid to the oldest workers, men, the most highly 
skilled,  workers  in  certain  occupations  (managers,  etc.),   
the most senior workers, full-time workers, employees on 
permanent contracts and staff of large firms.
The study draws attention to the existence of significant 
pay differentials between sectors, even after allowing for 
the effects of the individual characteristics listed above. In 
fact, pay differentials between sectors are due partly to 
employment composition and to the characteristics of the 
jobs and the firms. Thus, some sectors (such as financial 
services) have a relatively high proportion of highly skilled 
workers  or  bigger  firms.  Adjusted  pay  differentials  are 
calculated in order to neutralise the influence of these 
characteristics. The adjusted pay differentials are clearly 
less marked, although they are still significant overall. The 
sectors which pay the highest wages are traditionally the 
oil industry, the chemical industry, the energy sector and 
financial services. Lower wages are found in the textile 
and  leather  sectors,  in  retailing,  and  in  the  hotel  and 
catering trade. The persistence of these pay differentials 
shows  that  non-competitive  forces  are  at  work  on  the 
labour market.
Rent sharing is one of the factors most frequently men-
tioned. Using the Belgian data, it is possible to include 
corporate  profits  (gross  operating  surplus  per  worker) 
in  the  analysis  as  well  as  the  individual  characteristics. 
The results show that the workers’ individual wages are 
undeniably influenced by the profitability of the employer 
firm, even after adjustment for the influence of the other 
characteristics  relating  to  the  worker  or  the  firm.  The 
dispersion of the adjusted pay differentials in Belgium is 
about one-third lower if the firms’ profits are taken into 
account.  That  is  irrefutable  evidence  that  a  substantial 
proportion of the pay differentials between sectors is due 
to rent sharing.
Between 1999 and 2005 there was no sign of any upward 
or downward trend in the dispersion of pay differentials 
between  sectors.  Conversely,  pay  differentials  between 
sectors are larger during an economic boom. Later we  (1)  The United States and Japan are also in this group.58
shall see that the existence of downward rigidity implies 
that wages are not adjusted downwards during periods 
of weak economic activity, whereas it is easier to increase 
them during favourable periods.
A  more  detailed  analysis  of  the  situation  in  Belgium 
showed that pay differentials between sectors were attrib-
utable partly to the competition which firms encounter on 
their main markets. Wages are lower in the sectors where 
competition is keenest, especially if the competitors are 
based in countries with relatively low income (Du Caju 
et al., 2010a).
For the purpose of making an international comparison, 
the  WDN  experts  also  have  individual  wage  data  from 
the  Structure  of  Earnings  Survey  covering  seven  other 
countries,  namely  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. Pay differentials between 
sectors were examined on the basis of that information 
(cf. Du Caju et al., 2010b).
The  hierarchy  of  the  sectors  according  to  the  level  of 
wages paid is comparable in all the countries examined. 
The  standard  deviation  of  these  (adjusted)  pay  differ-
entials,  which  provides  an  indication  of  the  dispersion 
of wages between sectors, or pay inequality, looks rela-
tively  small  in  Belgium  and  Germany  (2002  statistics). 
In contrast, it is fairly large in Hungary, Ireland and Spain, 
  countries where wage setting is less coordinated.
Since the individual characteristics of the workers, their 
occupation or their employer, cannot explain the whole 
of the pay differentials between sectors, the researchers 
looked for variables specific to the sectors and linked to 
the level of wages. The pay differentials obtained for these 
eight  countries  were  therefore  combined  with  sectoral 
information relating to competition and performance. It 
appears that, after neutralisation of the influence of indi-
vidual characteristics, wages are highest in sectors where 
competition is weakest – notably the energy sector – and 
those where firms achieve better results and are, in other 
words, more profitable, such as the oil industry. That find-
ing confirms the existence of non-competitive forces at 
work on the labour market, implying that workers may 
be paid higher wages by firms which have market power.
2.  Wage and price adjustments
In order to analyse wage dynamics it is essential to obtain 
an idea of wage rigidity. Moreover, one of the conclu-
sions  of  the  ESCB’s  previous  research  network,  namely 
the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN), was that sectors 
and products are decidedly heterogeneous in regard to 
price rigidity (Altissimo et al., 2006), one reason being the 
cost structure at the level of the sectors and firms. The 
IPN showed that prices were adjusted less frequently in 
sectors where labour costs represented a large percentage 
of the total cost, such as the service sector. These findings 
suggested the existence of a link between price and wage 
rigidity,  and  more  particularly  that  the  observed  price 
rigidity reflected inertia in wage adjustments. The WDN 
therefore devoted much attention to analysing price and 
wage rigidity. It developed a number of measures for that 
purpose : this section discusses the frequency and timing 
of adjustments. The third section presents the criteria of 
nominal and real downward wage rigidity.
2.1  Frequency of wage and price adjustments
The frequency of wage and price adjustments is a criterion 
of rigidity/flexibility. We find that wages do not change 
frequently,  generally  only  once  a  year  (Druant  et  al., 
2009). On average, of more than 15,000 European firms 
polled, 60 p.c. adjust wages annually. A quarter of firms 
do so less often, while 12 p.c. adjust wages more than 
once  a  year.  Prices  are  adjusted  more  frequently :  only 
40 p.c. of firms make annual changes, and barely 7 p.c. 
chart  2  dispErsion of pay diffErEntials BEtwEEn 
sEctors in 2002
(standard deviation of differentials between sectoral wages 

































































Adjusted pay differentials (1)
Source  : Du Caju et al. (2010b).
(1)  Adjusted for the influence of age, sex, education, occupation, seniority, 
employment contract, working time and size of firm.59
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adjust prices even less often. In terms of implicit duration, 
that means that wages remain unchanged for 15 months 
on average, while the average interval between two suc-
cessive price changes is 9.6 months.
In Belgium, prices are adjusted at a frequency similar to 
the average for all firms polled, but wages are adjusted 
more often. In fact, the average frequency is 12.6 months 
for wages in Belgium while the interval between two price 
adjustments is 9.9 months. The higher frequency of wage 
adjustments in Belgium is due to the indexation system, 
namely the fact that wages are automatically linked to the 
movement in the health index. Indexation is a key factor 
leading to regular wage adjustments, but – as will become 
apparent later – it is not an sign of wage flexibility ; rather 
the  reverse.  That  also  points  to  defects  in  the  use  of 
adjustment  frequency  measures.  Other  rigidity/flexibility 
criteria will be discussed later in the article.
Apart from indexation, other labour market institutions 
explain  some  of  the  differences  between  countries  in 
terms of wage adjustment frequency. Wages are adjusted 
more often in firms concluding a collective wage agree-
ment at the level of the firm ; conversely, a high coverage 
rate  for  collective  wage  agreements  (taking  all  levels 
together)  and  strict  employment  protection  legislation   
(or  EPL)  produce  the  opposite  effect.  These  factors  lie 
behind the considerable heterogeneity between countries 
in regard to wage adjustments. It is nevertheless notewor-
thy that no major differences are apparent between the 
group of euro area countries and the group of countries 
not belonging to that area, despite the substantial dif-
ferences between those groups of countries in terms of 
labour market institutions.
2.2  Timing of wage and price adjustments
Apart  from  data  on  adjustment  frequencies,  the  WDN 
supplies  information  on  the  way  in  which  prices  and 
wages react to new circumstances. Thus, it analysed the 
timing of wage and price adjustments, and more particu-
larly their concentration in certain months. The literature 
on  the  subject  distinguishes  between  time-dependent 
strategies and state-dependent strategies. If the method 
of setting prices and wages is time-dependent, the adjust-
ment moment is exogenous : it does not depend on the 
economic situation. If the method of setting prices and 
wages is state-dependent, then economic conditions do 
determine the timing of the adjustment. It is important 
for monetary policy to know which of these strategies 
lies behind the wage or price policy of firms. In a state-
dependent  context,  prices  and  wages  will  react  imme-
diately to shocks which are (sufficiently) large, whereas 
in a time-dependent context firms will still wait until the 
predetermined time, even in the event of major shocks, 
and will therefore display more rigid behaviour.
The  WDN  study  provides  clear  indications  that  wage 
adjustments  are  time-dependent  (Druant  et  al.,  2009) : 
53 p.c. of firms adjust wages in a specific month, while 
34  p.c.  do  so  in  the  case  of  price  adjustments.  These 
time-dependent wage adjustments are more common in 
euro area countries, where this is the strategy adopted by 
61 p.c. of firms. The same percentage was recorded for 
Belgium (Druant et al., 2008). That finding reflects the 
great importance of collective wage agreements in the 
euro area.
Almost 30 p.c. of time-dependent wage adjustments are 
made in January, and that January-effect is found in all 
countries. Moreover, price and wage adjustments are syn-
chronised to some extent : in both cases, there is a peak 
in January. A quarter of Belgian firms adjust wages during 
that month. In some countries, firms also mention another 
month in which wage adjustments are concentrated, such 
chart  3  frEquEncy of wagE and pricE 
adJustmEnts  (1)























































































Basic pay in all countries (2) (3)
Prices in all countries (2)
Basic pay in Belgium (3)
Prices in Belgium
Source  : Druant et al. (2009).
(1)  Results weighted on the basis of employment and scaled by omitting missing 
replies.
(2)  AT, BE, CZ, EE, EL, ES, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, NL, PL, PT, SI.
(3)  Basic pay is equal to fixed salary excluding bonuses.60
(1)  Cyprus is not included in the table because the survey was conducted later and 
the data are not entirely comparable.
as July in Belgium (12 p.c.) and in France (26 p.c.). This 
pattern of wage adjustments is attributable to the fact 
that collective wage agreements generally take effect at 
the same time, and to wage indexation. For instance, in 
France  minimum  wages  are  indexed  in  July,  triggering 
the adjustment of other wages. In Belgium, the wages of 
almost 60 p.c. of workers are indexed at fixed intervals. 
The commonest frequency is one year – which accounts 
for the January peak – but half-yearly indexation is also 
common – hence another peak in July – and so is quar-
terly  indexation,  producing  additional  smaller  peaks  in 
April and October.
2.3  Link between wage and price adjustments
In analysing the link between wages and prices, the WDN 
did not only examine the timing of the adjustments but 
also considered whether wages are reflected in prices, and 
whether that is significant.
The survey contained a question on firms’ response to 
a widespread and unexpected increase in labour costs. 
Almost 60 p.c. of firms would react to such a shock by 
increasing  prices  (ECB,  2009).  A  similar  proportion  of 
firms would cut their costs, while a smaller percentage 
would  reduce  their  margins  or  cut  production.  Belgian 
firms’  behaviour  is  largely  in  line  with  these  findings : 
cost reduction is the commonest strategy (67 p.c.), even 
though 60 p.c. of participants mention price adjustments 
(Druant et al., 2008). As is the case, on average, for all 
countries,  half  of  the  Belgian  firms  polled  reduce  their 
margins, whereas barely one-tenth cut production.
It is mainly in firms where labour costs represent a high 
percentage of total costs that wages have a big impact 
on prices. The factors which moderate the transmission 
are fierce competition, a high percentage of exports, and 
the firm’s size. Firms facing stiff competition or obtaining 
a  large  proportion  of  their  turnover  from  exports,  and 
therefore active on a competitive foreign market, are less 
inclined  to  adjust  prices  if  a  shock  affects  their  labour 
costs. In fact, both a price cut or a price rise could be 
detrimental to their profitability, the first on account of 
the pressure which it would place on profit margins, and 
the second in view of the fall in turnover. Firms with a 
large  workforce  have  other  ways  of  adapting,  e.g.  by 
cutting the volume of labour or reducing costs other than   
labour costs.
The evidence obtained from the survey results are more 
difficult to reproduce on the basis of a micro-economic 
analysis. The elasticity of prices and wages seems to be 
fairly  low,  and  the  transmission  of  intermediate  input 
prices outstrips that of wages.
2.4  Indexation of wages in line with inflation
Examination of the link between wages and prices auto-
matically raises the question of the extent to which infla-
tion determines wages. The definition of the concept of 
wage indexation, and hence how to measure it, was hotly 
debated  by  the  network,  because  the  absence  of  any 
formal wage indexation mechanism does not mean that 
wage policy takes no account of inflation.
Two studies conducted by the WDN, namely the survey 
on wage setting by firms (Druant et al., 2009) and the 
survey of the institutional characteristics of wage bargain-
ing mechanisms (Du Caju et al., 2008), make this clear.
The  survey  contained  a  question  asking  whether  the 
firms have a wage policy whereby inflation determines 
adjustments to basic pay. There could be either a formal 
automatic link or a policy which takes informal account of 
the rise in consumer prices.
An automatic link is fairly unusual in Europe. It operates 
in Belgium, where it is applied by 98 p.c. of firms, and in 
Luxembourg, Spain and Cyprus.  (1) In the other countries, 
whether or not they belong to the euro area, inflation 
is  generally  taken  into  account  informally  during  wage 
bargaining. On average, the internal wage policy of one-
third of firms consists in adjusting basic wages in line with 
inflation. That is true for both the group of countries in 
the euro area and those outside it.
Table  1	 Reaction	to	a	peRmanent	Rise	
in	labouR	costs	 (1)
(firms replying “important” or “very important”,  
as a percentage of the total)
 




Reduce costs   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.0 66.9
Increase prices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.2 62.2
Reduce margins  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49.8 50.0
Cut production   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.5 11.5
Sources : Druant et al. (2008), ECB (2009).
(1)  Results weighted on the basis of employment and scaled by omitting  
the missing replies.
(2)  AT, BE, CZ, EE, EL, ES, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, NL, PL, PT, SI.
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That percentage may underestimate the influence of price 
movements on wage setting. The results of the study of 
the institutional characteristics of wage bargaining mech-
anisms in fact show that inflation plays a key role in wage 
bargaining  in  all  the  countries  considered.  Productivity, 
competitiveness,  taxation  and  parafiscal  levies  are  also 
explicitly mentioned, though to a lesser extent.
3.  Nominal and real downward rigidity
The  above  results  concerning  the  frequency  of  adjust-
ments to prices and nominal wages suggest that, in the 
short term, price rigidity combined with nominal wage 
rigidity leads to real wage rigidity. Given the importance 
of  wage  rigidity  for  the  dynamics  of  employment  and 
inflation, and for monetary policy, the WDN conducted 
supplementary studies. These provided alternative meas-
ures of wage rigidity and an analysis of its causes.
3.1  Wage rigidity affects existing employees ...
The first WDN survey of firms, conducted in 2007, reveals 
strong resistance to reductions in the wages of existing 
employees (Babecký et al., 2009a). The resistance to wage 
reductions may be reflected in a wage freeze. In fact, only 
2.6 p.c. of firms introduced wage cuts in the five years 
preceding the survey, and 9 p.c. of firms applied a nomi-
nal wage freeze.
The  survey  also  asked  firms  what  causes  them  not  to 
reduce  wages  when  the  economic  situation  requires 
(Babecký et al., 2009c). It seems that the main reasons are 
the potential impact on the workers’ morale, their effort, 
and hence their productivity, and fears that some of them 
may leave the firm. Almost nine out of ten firms consider 
these factors to be important or very important. The same 
factors recur in similar surveys conducted in the United 
States (Bewley, 1999). These findings leave little scope for 
structural reforms designed to increase downward wage 
flexibility. Yet it should be noted that, in European coun-
tries, a third reason mentioned by firms concerns institu-
tional restrictions resulting from collective agreements or 
the existence of specific wage regulations. For example, in 
Portugal the law prohibits reductions in nominal wages.
The results of the follow-up survey indicate that the per-
centage  of  firms  cutting  wages  increased  only  slightly, 
from 2.6 to 3.2 p.c., during the economic and financial 
Table  2	 Firms	which	pursue	a	policy	oF	adjusting	
basic	pay	in	line	with	inFlation	 (1)





No formal  
rule,  
but inflation  





All countries  (3)   . . . . . . . . . . 17.5 19.9 36.3
Euro area countries  (4)   . . . . 20.8 16.0 35.7
Belgium, Luxembourg  
and Spain  . . . . . . . . . . . 66.6 11.5 78.1
Other countries  . . . . . . 8.2 17.1 23.9
Countries outside the  
euro area  (5)  . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7 30.0 38.1
Source : Druant et al. (2009).
(1)  Results weighted on the basis of employment and scaled by omitting  
missing replies. Basic pay is equal to fixed salary without bonuses.
(2)  As some firms use various methods of adjustment in line with inflation,  
the total does not necessarily equal the sum of the two methods.
(3)  AT, BE, CZ, EE, EL, ES, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, NL, PL, PT, SI.
(4)  AT, BE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SI.
(5)  CZ, EE, HU, LT, PL.
 
chart  4  firms rEporting a Basic pay cut or pay 
frEEzE  (1)



































































































































Introduced during a crisis
Planned during a crisis
PAY CUT PAY FREEZE
Sources  : WDN, NBB.
(1)  Results weighted on the basis of employment and scaled by omitting missing 
replies. Basic pay is equal to fixed salary without bonuses.
(2)  The same sample of firms was used for both surveys.
(3)  AT, BE, CZ, EE, ES, FR, IT, LU, NL, PL.62
(1)  The specific working time reduction measures taken during the economic 
recession are discussed in section 5.2.
(2)  Two WDN studies examine these questions (Carneiro et al., 2009 ; and Carlsson et 
al., 2009). In Portugal, the results show that the wages of new recruits are twice 
as sensitive to the national unemployment rate as the wages of existing workers. 
However, in Portugal as in Sweden, the reaction of wages to productivity is similar, 
albeit slightly stronger, in the case of new recruits. 
(3)  In Belgium, 52 p.c. of firms state that the wages of new recruits are set according 
to the wages of workers at the same level in the firm, and 34 p.c. according to 
sectoral collective agreements.
(4)  On the basis of the survey results for a small number of countries : Germany, 
Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia.
crisis. That is borne out by the macro-economic statistics, 
which  indicate  that  there  was  little  change  in  nominal 
wages.  In  contrast,  the  percentage  of  firms  stating 
that they had imposed a wage freeze went up from 9 
to  35  p.c.  Moreover,  35  p.c.  of  firms  stated  that  they 
intended to freeze wages in the future. These trends are 
also evident in Belgium although the increase in the wage 
freeze is weaker there. The percentage of Belgian firms 
reporting a wage freeze was almost twice as high during 
a crisis (27 p.c.), compared to a normal situation (15 p.c.), 
whereas the figure tripled for countries as a whole. In 
contrast to other countries, only a small percentage of 
Belgian firms stated that they intended to freeze wages 
in the future.
3.2  ... but also new recruits
Economic theory clearly states that corporate profit opti-
misation  depends  on  the  marginal  cost,  which  in  turn 
depends on the newly recruited worker. Moreover, most 
research work on this subject has shown that, in normal 
times  and  in  the  absence  of  any  specific  measures  (1), 
labour  adjustments  tend  to  be  made  more  by  varying 
employment  than  by  changing  the  number  of  hours 
worked per person. In this context, wages of new recruits 
become one of the determinants for hiring staff. Lastly, 
since incumbent workers’ wages have a strong downward 
rigidity,  those  of  newly  recruited  workers  could  play  a 
major role in wage flexibility. However, macro-economic 
estimates indicate that wage rigidity in the case of new 
recruits is broadly similar to that for existing employees. 
Estimates  based  on  micro-economic  wage  data  do  not 
so far allow an unequivocal conclusion, and cover only a 
small number of countries  (2).
The WDN survey examined the strategies which firms use 
to cut their labour costs, and the factors determining the 
wages of new recruits. It emerges that if firms can take on 
cheaper workers to replace employees leaving voluntarily 
or retiring, that is mainly because of a labour force com-
position effect, e.g. where older employees are replaced 
by younger staff. This strategy is common in Belgium, as 
it is in France and Italy, combined with the use of early 
retirement. It is more often adopted by large firms and 
those facing strong competition (Babecký et al., 2009b).
Conversely,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  new  recruits  are 
paid according to the same pay scale as the firm’s exist-
ing employees with the same level of experience, or in 
accordance with collective agreements.  (3) In fact, fewer 
than 15 p.c. of firms in the euro area and 36 p.c. of firms 
in countries outside the euro area would pay new recruits 
less than the wages of existing employees with a compa-
rable level of experience (Galuscak et al., 2010).
The main reason,  (4) mentioned by over 80 p.c. of firms, 
for not deviating from their internal pay scale when taking 
on new staff concerns considerations of fairness and the 
potential negative impact of such a move on the employ-
ees’ morale and effort.
3.3  Heterogeneity of downward wage rigidity
The  above  findings  reveal  some  resistance  to  nominal 
wage reductions. However, a distinction must be made 
between nominal and real wage rigidity. One of the fac-
tors restricting the scope for varying real wages concerns 
wage indexation : in the absence of indexation, nominal 
wage rigidity leads to real wages being adjusted in the 
opposite direction from prices.
Two types of measures were used to assess the degree of 
downward wage rigidity. The first is based on individual 
wage  data  (Du  Caju  et  al.,  2007,  2009 ;  and  Messina 
et al., 2009). It defines downward nominal wage rigidity 
(DNWR)  as  the  percentage  of  workers  whose  nominal 
wages  do  not  decline,  whereas  they  would  have  been 
reduced in the absence of rigidity. This constraint leads to 
the freezing of many workers’ nominal wages. Downward 
real wage rigidity (DRWR) is defined as the percentage 
of  workers  whose  wages  at  least  keep  pace  with  the 
reference inflation rate, whereas they would have been 
reduced in the absence of rigidity.
The  second  measure  of  wage  rigidity  is  based  on  the 
results  of  the  survey  of  firms  (Babecký  et  al.,  2009a). 
Downward  nominal  wage  rigidity  is  measured  by  the 
percentage of firms which froze wages during the five 
years preceding the survey. Real wage rigidity is meas-
ured by the percentage of firms reporting a significant 
link between wage adjustments and inflation. There is a 
positive correlation between the measures based on the 
survey and those based on individual wage data, although 
they are difficult to compare.
Overall,  the  results  indicate  that  the  dominant  type  of 
wage rigidity in Europe is real rigidity. On average, 17 p.c. 
of firms are subject to DRWR, compared to 10 p.c. for 
DNWR. The euro area countries exhibit greater real rigidity 63
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(DRWR) than nominal rigidity (DNWR). Conversely, coun-
tries not belonging to the euro area see more DNWR than 
DRWR.
Real wage rigidity is linked to indexation mechanisms, be 
they formal mechanisms like those in Belgium, or infor-
mal links whereby inflation is taken into account in wage 
bargaining. Nominal wage rigidity can be attributed to 
the influence of collective bargaining, plus employment 
protection.  One  explanation  for  this  correlation  is  that 
workers are less inclined to accept pay concessions when 
the redundancy situation is more favourable to them, i.e. 
if there is little fear of job losses.
Overall, the results show that the type of wage rigidity 
varies  significantly,  even  within  the  euro  area.  Nominal 
rigidity  prevails  in  Austria,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy,  the 
Netherlands and Portugal, whereas real rigidity dominates 
in  Belgium,  Finland,  Luxembourg  Spain  and  Sweden. 
Other countries feature a mix of real and nominal rigidity. 
The heterogeneity of downward wage rigidity between 
euro  area  countries  has  considerable  implications  for 
the impact of the common monetary policy on national 
economies, as will be explained in the next section.
4.  Lessons of New-Keynesian models 
and macro-economic implications
4.1  Presentation of the model
Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) constructed and esti-
mated a New-Keynesian reference model which combines 
nominal and real frictions in order to faithfully reproduce 
the dynamics of seven basic macro-economic series : GDP, 
consumption,  investment,  wages,  inflation,  key  interest 
rate and employment. However, in regard to the WDN’s 
aim, this model suffers from an over-simplistic representa-
tion of the labour market. It is a market without friction, 
and with only voluntary unemployment. De Walque et al. 
(2010a) developed a variant of this model by combining 
the model of Smets and Wouters with a labour market 
featuring  frictional  unemployment.  In  this  model,  firms 
and  workers  negotiate  nominal  wages.  However,  the 
wages of existing employees are not renegotiated in each 
period ;  there  is  only  a  degree  of  probability  that  such 
negotiations  will  take  place.  Similarly,  newly  recruited 
workers may either be paid at the wage prevailing in the 
firm which takes them on, or negotiate their wages with 
the firm under the prevailing macro-economic conditions. 
Wages  which  are  not  formally  negotiated  are  partially 
indexed to past inflation. The aggregate real wage is the 
arithmetical mean of wages in the economy, or in accord-
ance with the above description :




































– wt is the aggregate real wage at time t
–   nt is the number of employees and mt is the number 
of new recruits




















All countries  (3)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 (IT) 17.1 98.2 (BE) 2.4 (ES) 9.6 26.5 (CZ)
Euro area countries  (4)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 (IT) 20.6 98.2 (BE) 2.4 (ES) 8.1 23.2 (NL)
Countries outside the euro area  (5)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 (EE) 8.5 23.5 (SI) 2.9 (SI) 13.4 26.5 (CZ)








(1)  The separation rate is the average over the estimation period of the flow of 
persons from an employment situation to an unemployment situation, as a ratio 
of the number of workers.64
(1)  This still concerns the seven basic macro-economic series (GDP, consumption, 
investment,, wages, inflation, key interest rate and employment). The sample 
covers the period from 1990Q1 to 2008Q4.
(2)  The probability that wages will be negotiated is converted to an average period 
between two sets of negotiations on the basis of the method described in 
Dixon and Kara (2006) in order to compare contracts with a fixed probability of 
reoptimisation (Calvo, 1983) with contracts having a constant term (Taylor, 1980). 
– wt
* is the negotiated wage at time t
–   ξw
o is the probability that an existing employee’s wage 
will not be renegotiated
–   ξw
n is the probability that a new recruit’s wage will not 
be negotiated
–   πt is price inflation at time t and π is long-term price 
inflation
–   γ is the degree of indexation of wages not renegoti-
ated in line with past inflation
Estimation of this model’s parameters (de Walque et al., 
2010b) for quarterly aggregate data  (1) on the euro area 
yields values in line with the micro-economic studies and 
surveys  conducted  by  the  WDN  and  described  above. 
Thus :
–    each quarter, 36.6 p.c. of wages are renegotiated : that 
figure implies that negotiated pay reviews take place 
on average every 4.4 quarters. That is comparable to 
the  15  month  period  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the 
survey ;  (2)
–    a similar percentage of new employees (37 p.c.) nego-
tiate their wages, which means that if new employees 
are given the opportunity to negotiate their wages, that 
is purely because the firm taking them on engages in 
wage bargaining with all its employees. This confirms 
that the wages of new recruits are determined by the 
wages currently prevailing in the firm which takes them 
on ;
–    the  degree  to  which  non  renegotiated  wages  are 
indexed  to  inflation  is  0.364,  which  means  that  the 
36.4 p.c. of firms/workers who do not engage in wage 
bargaining,  nominal  wages  are  adjusted  in  line  with 
the  inflation  recorded  in  the  preceding  period.  That 
percentage  is  totally  in  accordance  with  the  survey 
findings, which indicated that 36.3 p.c. of firms adjust 
wages in line with inflation.
4.2  Lessons of the model
As explained at the beginning of section 3 and very clearly 
illustrated by Knell (2010) with the aid of a theoretical 
model, real wage rigidity is the outcome of the combi-
nation of nominal rigidities on the market in goods and 
services and on the employment market. Two opposing 
examples  can  be  used  to  illustrate  this.  If  wages  are 
renegotiated  in  each  period,  they  are  perfectly  flexible 
and are adjusted to recorded inflation so that real and 
nominal wages coincide. If prices are freely adjusted in 
each period, relative prices are constant in the model so 
that the concept of inflation disappears, and nominal and 
real values coincide.
The  New-Keynesian  Phillips  curve  formalizes  the  latter 
reasoning :
ˆ π  ˆ ˆ π  t = β⋅Et t+1+κ⋅x  t   (2)
where
–   ˆ π   is the deviation of inflation from stationary equilibrium
–    β is a discount rate
–   E is the expectations operator
–   κ is a parameter dependent on the probability of price 
adjustments
–   ˆ x   is the marginal cost expressed as the deviation from 
the stationary equilibrium
Since wages are an essential component of production 
costs, it is immediately evident that inflation persistence is 
attributable partly to nominal price rigidity (κ) and partly 
to the more or less smooth profile of the reaction of the 
marginal cost ˆ x  t to an unexpected shock.
However, the marginal cost, i.e. the cost of producing one 
additional unit, does not depend on the aggregate labour 
cost but on the cost of the unit of labour to be taken on 
in order to make that additional unit. This means that the 
main explanatory factor for the marginal cost is the wage 
of the newly recruited workers.
Chart 5 shows for three variables (inflation, real wages 
and working hours) the percentage change compared to 
the equilibrium situation following an unexpected 1 per-
centage point cut in the central bank’s key interest rate. 
The reaction calculated for the estimated model is shown 
in pale blue, while – for comparison – an economy which 
is identical to the first except for the degree of flexibility in 
the wages of new recruits is shown in dark blue. The chart 
shows these reactions after 1, 2 and 3 years. It is perfectly 
clear  that,  although  the  new  recruits  represent  only  a 
small  percentage  of  the  wage  bill,  the  fact  that  their 
wages are fixed according to macro-economic conditions 
(dark blue) or according to the remuneration prevailing in 
the firm which takes them on (light blue) implies a crucial 
difference in terms of the volatility of inflation and of real 
aggregate wages. In the first case (dark blue), new recruits 
take advantage of the favourable macro-economic con-
ditions generated by the cut in the key interest rate to 
negotiate higher wages. That has a direct impact on the 
marginal cost  ˆ x  t and hence on inflation. That inflation 
is taken into account by the existing workers who have 
the  opportunity  to  renegotiate  their  wages.  Since  the 65
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proportion of those workers is estimated at around one-
third, this has a major impact on aggregate real wages. 
So in this case, inflation and real wages react strongly but 
not very persistently. The opposite occurs if new recruits 
do not negotiate their wages and instead receive wages 
which were negotiated in the past. It should be noted that 
the parameter ξw
n – probability that the wages of a new 
recruit will not be negotiated – is essential to reproduce 
the observed rigidity of real wages and the observed infla-
tion persistence. Conversely, its effect on the volatility of 
the real sector of the economy is far less significant, as 
is evident from the smaller difference in the reaction of 
working hours between the two scenarios.
The indexation of wages to inflation is generally viewed as 
a key element in real wage rigidity since it prevents infla-
tion from affecting the real remuneration of labour. The 
effect of indexation can again be seen with the aid of the 
New-Keynesian model described above. Chart 6 presents 
the reaction of the same three variables as before to a 
1 p.c. fall in productivity  (1) if the degree of indexation is as 
estimated, namely 36.4 p.c. For comparison, an economy 
in which wages are 100 p.c. indexed to past inflation is 
shown in dark blue.
For all types of shocks (supply, demand, monetary policy, 
etc.)  full  wage  indexation  increases  both  the  volatility 
of inflation and its persistence, by generating what are 
known  as  second  round  effects :  the  transmission  of 
inflation  to  wages  via  indexation  affects  the  marginal 
cost,  which  drives  up  inflation  via  the  New-Keynesian 
Phillips  curve  (see  equation  (2)).  For  the  type  of  shock 
considered here, namely a fall in productivity, a shock to 
which prices and wages react in opposing directions, the 
strong reaction of inflation caused by stronger indexation 
prevents the decline of real wages and therefore increases 
real wage rigidity. By preventing real wages from being 
adjusted downwards, indexation transfers the adjustment 
of the economy to its real component, namely employ-
ment and working hours.
Other factors relating to labour market institutions play 
a  role  in  determining  real  wage  rigidity.  Thus,  when 
negotiating  wages,  firms  and  workers  take  account  of 
factors which are influenced by the business cycle (labour 
market  tensions,  expected  inflation,  etc.)  but  also  of 
reserve wages, i.e. the level of wages below which an 
unemployed person will not accept a job, that remains 
unchanged  overall.  Therefore,  replacement  incomes 
which are generous in both value and duration increase 
the workers’ reserve wages and limit the change in wages 
throughout the cycle. Similarly, if the workers have little 
bargaining power, they will be less able to take advantage 
of cyclical improvements in the macro-economic situation, 
chart  5  rEaction to an unExpEctEd 1 pErcEntagE point cut in thE cEntral Bank’s kEy intErEst ratE
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Estimated model
Flexible wages for new recruits
INFLATION (Absolute deviation)
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REAL WAGES (Relative deviation)
4 quarters 8 quarters 12 quarters
WORKING HOURS (Relative deviation)
Source  : NBB, based on de Walque et al. (2010b).
(1)  This example can be interpreted as an unexpected rise in the costs of 
intermediate goods required for production (energy, commodities, etc.).66
chart  6  rEaction to an unExpEctEd 1 p.c. fall in productivity
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Estimated model
Full indexation of wages to inflation
INFLATION (Absolute deviation)
4 quarters 8 quarters 12 quarters
REAL WAGES (Relative deviation)
4 quarters 8 quarters 12 quarters
WORKING HOURS (Relative deviation)
Source  : NBB, based on de Walque et al. (2010b).
further limiting the pro-cyclicality of wages. The level of 
worker  protection  may  also  influence  wage  rigidity.  By 
strengthening  the  workers’  bargaining  power  in  times 
of weak economic activity, it makes them less inclined to 
accept wage concessions.
4.3  Macro-economic implications
As  illustrated  by  chart  6,  real  wage  rigidity  greatly 
increases  the  volatility  of  working  hours  and  height-
ens inflation persistence. It complicates the conduct of   
monetary  policy  by  emphasising  the  choice  between 
employment and price stability. By generating persistent 
inflation  expectations,  real  wage  rigidity  increases  the 
cost of fighting inflation in the event of price shocks. 
That  makes  it  all  the  more  important  to  ensure  firm 
anchoring  of  inflation  expectations.  Moreover,  as  the 
ECB’s sole objective is price stability, real wage rigidity 
underlines the need to adopt a medium-term view of 
that  objective  in  order  to  avoid  excessive  volatility  of 
interest rates and of real activity.
Chart  6  illustrates  very  clearly  that  in  an  economy 
where  real  wages  display  strong  downward  rigid-
ity – e.g. as a result of strong wage indexation in line 
with inflation – prices react more strongly to a pro-
ductivity  shock.  Consequently,  in  a  monetary  union, 
countries with institutions which engender more real 
wage  rigidity  will  suffer  from  a  persistent  decline  in 
competitiveness in the event of a common shock. That 
loss of competitiveness will then have an even bigger 
impact on the real economy in those countries (Fahr 
and Smets, 2009).
Economists have long argued that price inflation should 
be slightly positive rather than strictly zero. That is due 
to the downward rigidity of nominal wages. The pur-
pose  of  this  modest  inflation  is  to  greese  the  wheels 
of the economy by allowing real wages to be adjusted 
downwards in the event of a shock, even though nomi-
nal wages are rigid. That argument becomes irrelevant 
in the face of real downward wage rigidity. Clearly, the 
greater the downward rigidity of real wages, the lower 
the optimum inflation rate. Fagan and Messina (2009) 
calculated  the  optimum  inflation  rate  for  economies 
calibrated in order to represent the labour market char-
acteristics  of  certain  countries.  For  the  United  States, 
the optimum rate was calculated at between 2 p.c. and 
5 p.c. according to the data used. Owing to the stronger 
nominal price rigidity and the significant downward real 
wage rigidity, the optimum inflation rate for the euro 
area as a whole is lower than in the United States, at just 
under 2 p.c., in line with the ECB’s inflation target. If the 
euro area’s labour market had the same characteristics 
as that of Belgium or Finland, that optimum rate would 
fall to 0 p.c.67
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5.  Reaction to adverse economic 
shocks
It  is  clear  from  the  foregoing  that  the  wages  of  both 
existing employees and new recruits undergo only minor 
downward adjustment if the need arises, and that this 
has  serious  implications  in  terms  of  employment.  The 
WDN examined the reaction of firms to adverse economic 
shocks, an analysis topic which became particularly rel-
evant at the time of the economic and financial crisis, 
when declining turnover was the principal feature.
5.1  Reaction in normal times
5.1.1  Adjusting wages as opposed to employment
The 2007 survey focused in particular on the way in which 
each  firm  reacted  to  three  types  of  adverse  shocks :  a 
decline in demand for its products/services, a rise in the 
cost of intermediate inputs, and a generalised increase in 
labour costs. In these three cases, firms usually adopt a 
strategy of cutting costs. Taking the average for the three 
shocks, almost 70 p.c. of firms consider that strategy to 
be  important  or  very  important.  Almost  60  p.c.  would 
adjust prices, whereas cutting margins or output was said 
to be less important.
Firms which adjust their costs in response to a shock were 
also asked to specify the strategy used. On average for the 
three shocks, 45 p.c. of the 15,000 firms polled cut their 
non-wage  costs.  33%  of  firms  reduce  their  workforce 
(both permanent and temporary staff). In accordance with 
the downward wage rigidity described above, they rarely 
cut wages, either basic pay or the variable pay compo-
nent. Barely 10 p.c. of firms cut working time.
In Belgium, firms also respond to shocks mainly by cutting 
their costs. That applies to 72 p.c. of them. However, they 
do  so  primarily  by  reducing  the  number  of  permanent 
and temporary workers (50 p.c. of firms) and - to a lesser 
extent  than  the  average  for  all  countries  –  by  cutting 
non-wage costs (39 p.c. of firms). Wage adjustments and 
reductions in working time are also used less frequently. 
There are clear differences according to the size of the 
firm’s workforce. Thus, there is a marked positive correla-
tion between firm size and the adoption of an employ-
ment adjustment policy : the bigger the firm, the greater 
the staff reduction. Conversely, the link between firm size 
and changes in non-wage costs is negative. Large firms 
in fact have more scope than small ones for cutting their 
workforce in the face of problems. That is probably why 
small firms are more likely to resort to cutting working 
time. Adjustment of the variable pay component is the 
approach most commonly used in firms which pay more 
bonuses, on average, namely large firms.
A more detailed analysis (Dhyne and Druant, 2010) shows 
that the difference between Belgium’s reaction and that 
of the other countries is significant and can be attributed 
to various factors, most of which constitute wage rigidi-
ties. More particularly, this concerns the fact that wages 
are largely set at a level higher than the firm (98.3 p.c. in 
Belgium, compared to 65.8 p.c. for all countries), the high 
coverage rate of collective wage agreements (89.1 p.c. 
against 60 p.c.), and the fact that almost all wages are 
inflation-linked (98.2 p.c. against 36.3 p.c.). Other factors 
which may explain the greater use of the employment 
channel in Belgium are the slightly higher share of labour 
(37.5 p.c. against 35 p.c.), the small share of the variable 
pay  component  in  total  labour  costs  (7.7  p.c.  against 
12.6  p.c.),  the  large  proportion  of  the  workforce  con-
sisting of low-skilled manual workers (49.6 p.c. against 
41.2  p.c.),  a  category  of  workers  who  are  generally 
cheaper  to  make  redundant,  and  the  relatively  flexible 
chart  7  cost-cutting stratEgiEs  (1)
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Source  : Dhyne and Druant (2010).
Results weighted on the basis of employment and scaled by omitting the missing 
replies.
(1)  AT, BE, CZ, EE, EL, ES, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, NL, PL, PT, SI.
(2)  AT, BE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, NL, PT, SI.
(3)  From 5 to 19 employees.
(4)  200 or more employees.68
Table  4	 Which	factors	explain	the	intensive	use	of	the	employment	channel	in	Belgium	?	 (1)
(percentage of the total number of firms, unless otherwise stated)
 
All countries  (2)
 





Collective wage agreements concluded at a level higher than  
the firm (+)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65.8 87.6 98.3
Coverage rate of collective wage agreements (+)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.0 77.3 89.1
Linking of wages to inflation (+)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.3 30.7 98.2
Share of labour in total costs (+) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.0 35.6 37.5
Variable pay component (–)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.6 12.1 7.7
Proportion of low-skilled manual workers in the workforce (+)   . . 41.2 39.7 49.6
Protection of permanent employees against individual  
dismissal  (4) (–)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.5 1.7
  factors	safeguarding	employment
Proportion of small firms (< 50 employees) (+)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49.1 49.5 67.0
Wage cushion (+)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n. n. 72.7
Source : Dhyne and Druant (2010).
(1)  Results weighted on the basis of employment and scaled by omitting the missing replies.
(2)  AT, BE, CZ, EE, EL, ES, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, NL, PL, PT, SI.
(3)  AT, BE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, NL, PT, SI.
(4)  Average of values between 0 and 4, corresponding to a rising degree of protection.
 
dismissal laws (1.7 on a scale ranging from 0 to 4 ; com-
pared to 2.5).
Other factors tend to safeguard employment in Belgium. 
Thus, the proportion of small firms (employing fewer than 
50 workers) comes to 67 p.c., compared to 49.1 p.c. for 
all countries. As stated earlier, small firms in fact have less 
scope  for  cutting  their  workforce  when  problems  arise. 
Moreover, small business owners may be unwilling to make 
staff redundant owing to the close working relationships 
with their staff. They look for other solutions, such as cut-
ting non-wage costs, while waiting for things to improve.  (1) 
Furthermore,  the  process  of  wage-setting  in  Belgium 
comprises mechanisms which make wages less rigid, thus 
protecting jobs. The wage cushion – the amount which 
firms pay on top of the sectoral pay scales (72.7 p.c. of 
them) – gives them some scope for adjusting actual wages 
in line with economic conditions, if necessary.
The results of the Belgian survey are borne out by a quan-
titative assessment based on individual remuneration data 
and data on firms for the period 1997-2001.
The growth of the wage bill of each firm was broken down 
into four components : (1) increase in wages of existing 
workers, (2) wage differential between new recruits and 
workers leaving the firm, (3) increase in the total number 
of days worked by existing employees, and (4) difference 
between days worked by new recruits and by workers 
leaving. The last two components together represent the 
growth of employment measured in terms of the number 
of days worked.
The analysis shows that, on average, both wage increases 
(3.7 p.c. – 1.4 p.c. = 2.3 p.c.) and fluctuations in employ-
ment (0.7 p.c. + 2.4 p.c. = 3.1 p.c.) account for changes 
in the wage bill (+5.4 p.c.).  (2) For firms whose wage bill 
increased, the rise was due more to increases in employ-
ment  than  to  changes  in  wages.  Where  the  wage  bill 
declines,  employment  bears  the  brunt  of  the  adjust-
ment.  The  elements  in  this  breakdown  in  fact  reveal 
that contractions in the wage bill are due to reductions 
in  employment  despite  the  nominal  wage  increases  of 
existing workers ; the contribution of the wages of new 
recruits remains negative. It should be noted that in the 
case of both reductions and increases in the wage bill, the 
nominal wages of existing workers rose by at least 3 p.c., 
on average. This reflects such factors as increases due to 
indexation, as well as real negotiated increases.
(1)  The results shown are only valid if the shock is insufficient to drive firms into 
bankruptcy. Since this is a one-off survey, it is not possible to control for the 
bankruptcies, which affect proportionately more small firms, being generally more 
sensitive to the business cycle.
(2)  On average, new recruits are paid about 15 p.c. less than existing workers. That 
difference is due, in particular, to the fact that firms do not usually grant holiday 
pay in the year in which the worker is taken on.69
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5.1.2  Permanent versus temporary staff
The greater use of the employment channel in Belgium 
in response to adverse economic shocks concerns both 
permanent and temporary staff. In regard to the former, 
Belgium is in second place in the ranking of the 14 coun-
tries considered. In regard to the reduction of temporary 
staff, Belgium is in fourth place. This means that, unlike 
in many other countries such as Spain, France and the 
Netherlands, in the event of an economic shock there is 
no trade-off between a marked fall in the number of tem-
porary employment contracts and a limited contraction of 
permanent employment.
More detailed analysis (Dhyne and Druant, 2010) shows 
that  a  large  percentage  of  temporary  workers  in  the 
total workforce increases the risk of a reduction in tem-
porary employment while safeguarding permanent jobs. 
Temporary  staff  therefore  act  as  a  buffer  in  periods  of 
adversity. Nonetheless, the proportion of temporary work-
ers in Belgium (8.7 p.c.) is below the average (13.3 p.c.). 
Moreover,  the  legislation  on  temporary  employment  is 
stricter in Belgium (2.6 on a scale ranging from 0 to 4, 
compared  to  2.2).  The  key  role  of  temporary  employ-
ment as a shock absorber can be explained partly by the 
low costs entailed in recruiting and dismissing temporary 
workers, namely 0.8 p.c. of the average costs associated 
with permanent staff (Dhyne and Mahy, 2009). In addi-
tion, temporary work is very widespread, particularly in 
large firms. While the proportion of temporary workers 
in  total  employment  is  low,  almost  20  p.c.  of  firms  in 
Belgium employ temporary workers.
It should be noted that, in Belgium, strict regulations on 
temporary  employment  and  a  high  level  of  protection 
against collective dismissal (4.1 against 3.2) are accompa-
nied by relatively flexible legislation on individual dismissal 
(1.7 against 2.5). In consequence, as stated earlier, over 
half of redundancies concern permanent staff, compared 
to an average of one-third for all countries examined.
5.1.3    Adjustment of real wages in line with productivity 
in Belgium
Another measure of wage rigidity is based on the elasticity 
of real wages in relation to productivity. In the absence of 
friction on the various markets, both the labour market 
and the product markets, that elasticity should be equal 
to  one,  which  means  that  changes  in  productivity  are 
reflected pro rata in changes in real wages. Two studies 
(Fuss  and  Wintr,  2009,  for  Belgium  and  Kilponen  and 
Turunen, 2009, for Finland) compare how wages react to 
circumstances specific to the firm as opposed to circum-
stances affecting the entire sector. This reveals that the 
elasticity of real wages in relation to the firm’s productiv-
ity is extremely low in Belgium (0.02). It should be noted 
that an equally low level is found for the other European 
countries  (France,  Italy,  Portugal,  Finland,  Sweden  and 
Hungary  (1)) for which comparable studies exist.
Conversely, the elasticity of real wages in relation to secto-
ral productivity is much greater (0.41) in Belgium, just as it 
is in Sweden. The analysis for Belgium suggests that this is 
due (partly) to the role played by collective bargaining at 
sectoral level. For one thing, the measure of the reaction 
of real wages to negotiated wage increases during the 
year is positive (0.26). In the long term, negotiated wage 
increases  are  almost  entirely  reflected  in  average  real 
wages of firms.  (2) Also, the index of negotiated increases 
is correlated with productivity changes at sectoral level, 
with long-term elasticity at 0.47.
(1)  See the respective articles by Biscourp et al. (2005), Guiso et al. (2005), Cardoso 
and Portela (2005), Kilponen and Turunen (2009), Carlsson et al. (2009), Katay 
(2008). Hungary alone has a higher elasticity (between 005 and 0.11), as a result 
of a more flexible labour market, far more decentralised wage bargaining and a 
very low coverage rate for collective bargaining.
(2)  The study by López-Novella and Sissoko (2009), based on total individual wages 
in the private sector in Belgium, also indicates that the elasticity of wages to 
negotiated increases is very close to one.
Table  5	 Growth	of	the	waGe	bill	of	firms	in	belGium	:	explanatory	factors
(Belgian firms with over 50 employees, 1997-2001)
 
Growth of  
the wage bill  
(in percentage)
 
Contribution to the growth of the wage bill (points of percentage)
 
increase in wages of  
existing workers
 
wage differential  
between new recruits  
and workers leaving  
the firm
 
change in the total  




between days worked  
by new recruits  
and by workers leaving
 
Average  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 3.7 –1.4 0.7 2.4
Firms whose wage bill increases 7.9 3.8 –1.4 1.5 4.0
Firms whose wage bill decreases –3.8 3.1 –1.5 –2.1 –3.2
Source : Fuss (2009).
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There  are  various  possible  explanations  for  this  result. 
First, it can be interpreted as a sign of wage rigidity. In 
that  connection,  it  can  be  said  that  the  Belgian  study 
indicates positive elasticity of employment in relation to 
the  firm’s  productivity,  in  accordance  with  the  theories 
predicting greater employment volatility in the case of real 
wage rigidity. Second, labour market tensions may be a 
significant factor. As highlighted by the survey results, one 
of the reasons which firms give for not reducing wages is 
the fear that their workers may leave and move to other 
firms. That is typically the case when the pay cut concerns 
an isolated firm, but is not a factor, or significantly less 
so, if all firms in the sector jointly decide to adjust wages. 
Collective bargaining offers a framework for consultation 
and coordination in regard to decisions on wages.
5.2  Reaction during the economic and financial 
crisis
The follow-up survey conducted in the midst of the eco-
nomic crisis examined whether the reaction of firms to 
the fall in their turnover was fundamentally different from 
that seen in normal times. In fact, the original survey had 
only considered the theoretical reaction to a hypotheti-
cal shock. As to the cost-cutting strategies, it should be 
noted that the firms participating in the follow-up survey 
no longer confined themselves to ticking a single option. 
They used several strategies simultaneously, and in each 
case they took stronger action than they had anticipated 
when responding to the original survey. The firms there-
fore reacted differently from the way in which they had 
anticipated in the case of a purely hypothetical situation. 
To permit a comparison of the results in normal times and 
those in a crisis, the latter were converted to the same 
scale so that the total of the strategies is equal to 100 p.c. 
The results need to be interpreted with due caution : it is 
advisable to focus on the trends apparent before and after 
the crisis, rather than the exact percentages.
As already stated in section 3.1, these results confirm that 
the firms which took part in both surveys make hardly any 
adjustments to basic pay, either in normal circumstances 
or in a crisis. The variable pay components made only a 
very small contribution to the adjustment process.
The decision to cut the number of hours worked is very 
noticeable :  during  the  crisis,  the  share  of  this  reaction 
in the total strategies adopted by all countries increased 
from 8 to 13 p.c. In Belgium, it increased fourfold, from 
5  to  20  p.c.  Ways  of  reducing  the  number  of  hours 
worked  included  limiting  or  abolishing  overtime  and 
making greater use of the time-credit system. However, in 
Belgium this reduction was achieved mainly by the system 
of temporary lay-offs. Under that system, the major part 
of the labour costs associated with surplus workers is no 
longer borne by the firm, whereas the workers concerned 
retain  a  contractual  link  with  their  employer,  who  can 
redeploy his staff as soon as business picks up. The already 
existing  system  of  temporary  lay-offs  was  extended  in 
reaction to the crisis. Similar systems were introduced or 
extended in other countries, entailing a decrease in hours 
worked.
During  the  crisis,  employment  also  contracted  strongly 
in the case of permanent employees, and even more so 
for temporary staff. The latter act as a buffer, absorbing 
cyclical  fluctuations.  Nevertheless,  a  smaller  number  of 
firms  than  in  the  original  survey  replied  that  they  had 
used the employment channel : 41 compared to 44 p.c. 
for all countries, and 46 compared to 57 p.c. for Belgium. 
It is also evident that the gap between Belgium and the 
average of the countries examined declined sharply from 
13 to 5 percentage points. These results suggest that the 
reaction to the crisis had not ended at the time of the 
survey. Once the reduction in hours worked has reached 
its limit, the staff will probably be cut further, since – in 
chart  8  cost-cutting stratEgiEs in normal timEs 
and in a crisis  (1)
(percentage of the total number of firms)(2)








 during a crisis
Belgium –
 in normal times
All countries in 
the follow-up survey – 
during a crisis (3)
All countries in 
the follow-up survey – 
in normal times (3)
Sources  : WDN, BNB.
(1)  Results weighted on the basis of employment and scaled by omitting the missing 
replies.
(2)  The same sample of firms was used for both surveys.
(3)  AT, BE, CZ, EE, ES, FR, IT, LU, NL, PL.71
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principle – temporary lay-offs can only absorb brief peri-
ods of falling demand.
In  response  to  the  crisis,  firms  also  made  substantial 
savings on their non-wage costs. That applies mainly to 
small firms which have less scope for reducing their work-
force. The Belgian survey examined the expense items on 
which firms make the biggest cuts : vehicle fleet, main-
tenance, travel and representation expenses, advertising 
and sponsorship.
Conclusion
Between  2006  and  2009  over  70  economists  from 
25  NCBs  and  the  ECB  together  with  external  consult-
ants analysed the dynamics of wages in Europe via the 
Wage Dynamics Network. The results contain a number 
of relevant findings, including for Belgium. In this respect, 
it is noticeable that the findings of the macro- and micro-
economic studies and the surveys are very coherent, and 
that increases their credibility.
The wage structure and the wage-setting institutions are 
relatively stable but differ from one country to another. 
However, the countries can be divided into groups sharing 
a set of institutional characteristics. The Belgian institu-
tions are comparable overall to those of most euro area 
countries,  except  that  the  indexation  of  wages  plays  a 
much greater role. There are significant, persistent wage 
differentials  between  sectors  which  can  only  be  partly 
explained  by  composition  effects  (the  fact  that  wages 
depend on the characteristics of the workers, their type of 
occupation and their employer), and which suggest that 
it is mainly in the less competitive sectors that firms share 
with their workers part of the rent which they obtain from 
their dominant position by paying higher wages.
Wage rigidity was examined from various angles. First, it 
seems that wages are revised less frequently than prices, 
and  often  at  fixed  intervals  rather  than  in  response  to 
changes in the economic environment. Second, firms are 
highly reluctant to reduce wages, and that may lead to 
a pay freeze. This was particularly apparent during the 
recent economic crisis. Third, when firms suffer negative 
shocks, wages play only a marginal role in cost adjust-
ment. That finding was borne out during the recent crisis. 
Finally,  downward  adjustments  rarely  affect  basic  pay, 
even in the case of new recruits, but instead apply mainly 
to the variable component.
In regard to wage rigidity, it is important to distinguish 
between  nominal  and  real  rigidity.  The  former  permits 
some scope for adjusting real wages via price inflation. 
That relative scope disappears if the rigidity is real. The 
emergence of real wage rigidity is encouraged by such 
factors  as  the  degree  of  employment  protection,  the 
level of replacement incomes, the centralisation of wage 
bargaining,  the  indexation  of  wages  in  line  with  price 
inflation and the lack of competition on the market in 
goods. The greater the downward real rigidity of wages, 
the more firms respond by adjusting their workforce in 
the face of negative shocks. To do that they not only cut 
the number of regular staff but also use the scope for 
adjustment offered by temporary staff and reductions in 
working time. This last option was used particularly during 
the recent crisis, with government support. The euro area 
has  downward  real  wage  rigidity  rather  than  nominal 
wage rigidity. That is particularly true in Belgium, the main 
reason being the system of automatic wage indexation.
On the basis of the results of the WDN research, it is pos-
sible to formulate a number of monetary policy implica-
tions. First, real wage rigidity makes it more complicated 
to  conduct  monetary  policy  in  that  it  leads  to  larger 
fluctuations in output and employment, and makes infla-
tion more persistent. Next, the optimum inflation rate is 
lower the greater the downward real rigidity of wages. 
That  implies  a  rather  low  inflation  target  for  the  euro 
area in general, in line with the ECB’s inflation target of 
just under 2 p.c., but that is still too high for Belgium. 
Finally, the research also shows that in a monetary union 
the countries with greater real wage rigidity suffer a loss 
of competitiveness in the event of adverse productivity 
shocks.  In  general, wage-setting  institutions play  a key 
role in the way in which firms and economies react to 
shocks. The institutional differences between euro area 
countries are therefore a challenge for monetary policy, 
a problem which will grow with each enlargement of the 
euro area. All this highlights the need for labour market 
reforms with a view to harmonisation and greater flex-
ibility. However, those reforms must be conducted in the 
overall  context,  striking  a  careful  balance  between  the 
optimum allocation of resources and social protection.72
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Austria  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548 3.57 336 6.15
Belgium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,420 9.22 992 18.16
Spain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,769 11.49 962 17.61
France  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,011 13.06 818 14.97
Greece  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401 2.60 – –
Ireland  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 5.51 – –
Italy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 6.18 676 12.37
Luxembourg  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456 2.96 299 5.47
Netherlands   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,068 6.94 670 12.26
Portugal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,320 8.57 – –
Slovenia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 650 4.22 – –
  non euro area
Czech Republic   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399 2.59 241 4.41
Estonia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366 2.38 163 2.98
Hungary   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,959 12.72 – –
Lithuania  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 2.16 – –
Poland  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 5.82 307 5.62
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